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JUSTIFIABLE USE OF DEADLY FORCE
IN LAW ENFORCEMENT

INTRODUCTION
Pennsylvania's recently enacted Crimes Code,' codifies the
previous law governing the justifiable use of force in law enforcement. Although patterned after the Model Penal Code, 2 the new
Pennsylvania statute differs from it in several respects. Additionally, the Crimes Code significantly alters existing law concerning
the justifiable use of deadly force in law enforcement. The author
will compare the defense of justification in the context of deadly
force used in law enforcement as it existed in Pennsylvania, and
as it is embodied in the Model Penal Code, with the new rules
codified in the Crimes Code. Specific subjects and their order of
discussion are the justifiable use of deadly force in (I) effecting
an arrest, which includes consideration of (A) necessity, (B) fresh
pursuit, (C) notice, (D) type of felony and (E) felony in fact
standard; (II) prevention of escape; and (III) prevention of the
commission of crime which includes consideration of (A) necessity, (B) type of felony, and (C) suppression of a riot.
I. EFFECTING Aw ARREST

A. Necessity
An obvious requirement for the justifiable use of deadly force
in effecting an arrest is that the actor must believe the deadly
force is necessary to effect the arrest. This requirement is con-

tained in case law, the Model Penal Code, and the Crimes Code.
In Commonwealth v. Long 3 the court held that deadly force may
be used to effect an arrest only if the felon sought to be apprehended cannot otherwise be taken. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has said that in effecting an arrest the justifiable use of
deadly force "grows out of the necessity of the case."4 The Model
Penal Code provides that deadly force is justifiable in effecting
an arrest only when the actor "believes that such force is immediately necessary to effect a lawful arrest." 5 The Crimes Code re1.
3.
4.

PA. STAT. ANrN. tit. 18, § 508 (Supp. 1973).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962).
17 Pa. Super. 641, 648 (1901).
Commonwealth v. Loughhead, 218 Pa. 429, 430, 67 A. 747, 748

5.

Subject to the provisions of this Section and of Section 3.09, the

2.

(1907).

quires that the actor must believe that the deadly force is "necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated.
B. Fresh Pursuit
According to the courts the actor must be in fresh pursuit of
the felon before he may justifiably use deadly force to subdue
him. 7 The fresh pursuit refers to the actor's immediate attempts
to consummate his initial effort of effecting the arrest, rather than
immediate pursuit of the criminal after the commission of the
crime.8 Although many of the cases in which the requirement
of fresh pursuit is discussed involve arrests by private individuals
not assisting a policeman, the opinions do not limit the requirement to such individuals.' Without discussing the requirement,
the court in Commonwealth v. Duerr10 noted that the defendant,
a police officer, was in "hot pursuit"" of the deceased in its consideration of the officer's defense of justifiable homicide. The
court's requirement of fresh pursuit is apparently closely related
to the requirement that the deadly force must be necessary to effect the arrest. Fresh pursuit may be interpreted as a requirement that the actor in using the deadly force is reacting immediately to the criminal's attempt to defeat the arrest. If there is delay between the time the arrest is initially attempted and when
the deadly force is used the necessity of the force is not established.
use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the
actor is making or assisting in making an arrest and the actor believes
that such force is immediately necessary to effect a lawful arrest. MODEL
PENAL COD § 3.07 (1) (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962).
6. A peace officer, or any person whom he has summoned or directed to assist him, need not retreat or desist from efforts to make a lawful arrest because of resistance or threatened resistance to the arrest.
He is justified in the use of any force which he believes to be necessary
to defend himself or another from bodily harm while making the arrest.
However, he is justified in using deadly force only when he believes that
such force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or such other person, or when he believes both that: (i)such force is
necessary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by resistance or escape; (ii) the person to be arrested has committed or attempted a
forcible felony or is attempting to escape and possesses a deadly weapon,
or otherwise indicates that he will endanger human life or inflict serious
bodily injury unless arrested without delay. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 508(a) (1) (Supp. 1973).
7. Commonwealth v. Allen, 443 Pa. 15, 19, 276 A.2d 539, 542 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Chermansky, 430 Pa. 170, 173, 242 A.2d 237, 240
(1968).
8. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grether, 204 Pa. 203, 205, 53 A. 753,
753 (1902) (the court found fresh pursuit by the person attempting the
arrest when he tried to subdue the criminal the day after the crime had
been committed).
9. Commonwealth v. Allen, 443 Pa. 15, 19, 276 A.2d 539, 542 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Chermansky, 430 Pa. 170, 173, 242 A.2d 237, 240 (1968);
Commonwealth v. Grether, 204 Pa. 203, 205, 53 A. 753, 753 (1902); Brooks
v. Commonwealth, 61 Pa. 352, 359 (1869).
10. 158 Pa. Super. 484, 45 A.2d 235 (1946).
11. Id. at 488, 45 A.2d at 237.
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Such a delay logically would require another attempt at arrest
to establish the reasonable belief in the necessity of the force.
The Model Penal Code does not specifically require fresh pursuit
as a prerequisite to the use of deadly force in effecting an arrest,
but does require that the actor believe the force is immediately
necessary to effect the arrest."2 This requirement of belief in immediate necessity is the equivalent of the case law's prerequisite
of fresh pursuit in that both the courts and the Model Penal Code
require that the deadly force be used as an immediate response to
the criminal's attempt to defeat the arrest. The Crimes Code, like
the Model Penal Code, does not specifically require fresh pursuit.
The Crimes Code states only that the actor must believe that the
deadly force is necessary. 1' The Crimes Code's prerequisite of belief in necessity rather than immediate necessity, however, apparently does not abolish the requirement of fresh pursuit. In place
of the Model Penal Code requirement that the actor believe that
the deadly force is immediately necessary, the Crimes Code requires the actor to believe that the force is "necessary to prevent
the arrest from being defeated by resistance or escape."'1 4 Since in
effect the Crimes Code states that the actor may use deadly force
to effect an arrest only when he reasonably"5 believes that the arrest will be defeated by the resistance or escape of the criminal,
the immediate response requirement of the case law and the Model
Penal Code is embodied in the Crimes Code. If an initial attempt
at arrest is defeated by resistance or escape the attempt of a second arrest would be necessary to establish the reasonable belief
that deadly force is required to subdue the person sought to be
arrested. The fact that the person sought to be arrested successfully avoided an effort to arrest him is not sufficient to justify
a reasonable belief that he will again avoid arrest if deadly force is
not used to subdue him.
C.

Notice

According to the case law the actor in certain situations must
give notice of his purpose for arrest before deadly force may justifiably be used.' 6 The courts have differentiated between police12.

See MODEL PENAL CODE

13.

See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 508(a) (1) (i) (Supp. 1973).

§3.07(1)

(Proposed Off. Draft, 1962).

14. Id.
15. When used in the Crimes Code the terms "believes" or "belief"
mean "reasonably believes" or "reasonable belief." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 501 (Supp. 1973).
16. Brooks v. Commonwealth, 61 Pa. 352, 359 (1869).

men and private persons attempting an arrest in regard to the requirement of notice to the person sought to be arrested. The courts
require that private persons, not assisting a policeman at his request, inform the person whom they are seeking to arrest of their
purpose before using the deadly force. 17 An exception to this general requirement is permitted when the surrounding circumstances
are sufficient to warn the person sought to be arrested of the actor's purpose.' 8 Thus, to sustain a defense of justification the
courts have required that the person at whom the deadly force was
directed must have known of the private person's purpose of arrest. In the case of police officers and those summoned to their
aid, 19 the courts have indicated that notice of the officer's legal
qualification and intent to make an arrest is not necessary. 20 The
courts have, however, noted that although they do not require a
policeman to give such notice, it would be prudent for the officer
to give the notice whenever possible.21 This view was adopted by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Shovlin v. Commonwealth2 2
where the court stated that "While in most cases it may be prudent
for the officer to give the notice before making the arrest, it is go",23
ing too far to say ... that he is required to do so. ....
The Model Penal Code provides that before the use of deadly
force is justified the person seeking to effect the arrest must
make the purpose of the arrest known to the person sought to be
arrested unless the actor believes that the purpose is "otherwise
known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person
to be arrested. '24 The Model Penal Code limits the use of deadly
17. Commonwealth v. Allen, 443 Pa. 15, 19, 276 A.2d 539, 542 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Chermansky, 430 Pa. 170, 173, 242 A.2d 237, 240 (1968);
Brooks v. Commonwealth, 61 Pa. 352, 359 (1869).
18. Commonwealth v. Allen, 443 Pa. 15, 19, 276 A.2d 539, 542
(1971); Commonwealth v. Chermansky, 430 Pa. 170, 173, 242 A.2d 237,
240 (1968); Commonwealth v. Long, 17 Pa. Super. 641, 648 (1901).
19. Every person who assists an officer in making an arrest, at
his request, has the same protection that is accorded the officer
himself, and acting in such capacity, he may resort to the same
measures to secure the arrest of the accused.
Commonwealth v. Fields, 120 Pa. Super. 397, 401, 183 A. 78, 80 (1936).
20. Commonwealth v. Negri, 414 Pa. 21, 32, 198 A.2d 595, 602 (1964);
Shovlin v. Commonwealth, 106 Pa. 369, 372 (1884); Commonwealth v.
Duerr, 158 Pa. Super. 484, 491, 45 A.2d 235, 238 (1946); Commonwealth v.
Long, 17 Pa. Super. 641, 648 (1901).
21. Shovlin v. Commonwealth, 106 Pa. 369, 372 (1884); Commonwealth v. Duerr, 158 Pa. Super. 484, 491, 45 A.2d 235, 238 (1946); Commonwealth v. Long, 17 Pa. Super. 641, 648 (1901); 3 PA. LAW ENcY. Arrest
§ 4 (1957).
22. 106 Pa. 369 (1884).
23. Id.at 372.
24. (a) The use of force is not justifiable under this section unless:
(i) the actor makes known the purpose of the arrest or believes that it is
otherwise known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to
be arrested; and (ii) when the arrest is made under a warrant, the warrant is valid or believed by the actor to be valid. (b) The use of deadly
force is not justifiable under this section unless: (i) the arrest is for a
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force to effect an arrest to a police officer or a private person summoned to his assistance. 25 The Model Penal Code, therefore, in
the context of notice to the person sought to be arrested, requires
policemen and their summoned private assistants to conform with
requirements similar to those applied by the Pennsylvania courts
to private persons not summoned by police who attempt to effect
an arrest.
The Crimes Code makes no mention of the requirement of
notice as a prerequisite to the use of deadly force to effect an arrest. Like the Model Penal Code, the Crimes Code limits the use of
deadly force to effect an arrest to policemen and private persons
summoned by policemen. 26 Since Pennsylvania case law holds that
a policeman or his summoned private assistant is not required to
give the person sought to be arrested notice of the purpose of the
arrest or of the legal authority of the officer, 27 the Crimes Code is
consistent in this respect with existing case law. The Crimes
Code, however, does not reflect the courts' view that the prudent
officer would give the notice whenever possible.28 It is submitted
that the position of the Model Penal Code, requiring a policeman
to give notice unless he believes the surrounding circumstances
are such that the person sought to be arrested knows of the actor's
purpose or that the notice cannot reasonably be given, 29 is a better
approach to the notice requirement. This view does not go so far
as to require the policeman to give the notice in all situations, but
does require the notice whenever it reasonably can be given. Inclusion in the Crimes Code of the Model Penal Code language would
have resulted in a requirement consistent with existing Pennsylvania case law. Such language would not have required the notice in all cases but would have given statutory expression of the
courts' repeated opinion that prudent practice would require giving the notice whenever possible3s
felony; and (ii) the person effecting the arrest is authorized to act as a
peace officer; and (iii) the actor believes that the force employed creates
no substantial risk of injury to innocent persons; and (iv) the actor believes that: (1) the crime for which the arrest is made involved conduct
including the use or threatened use of deadly force; or (2) there is a
substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious
bodily harm if his apprehension is delayed. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07
(2) (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962).
25. Id.
26. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 508(a) (1) (Supp. 1973).
27. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
28. See cases cited note 21 supra.
29. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 (2) (a) i) (Proposed Off. Draft,
1962).

30.

See cases cited note 21 supra.

D. Type of Felony
Before deadly force may justifiably be used to effect an arrest case law requires that a felony must have been committed.1
At common law the commission of any felony was sufficient to
2
justify the deadly force whether the actor was a police officer1
or an independently acting private person 3 In Commonwealth
4
v. Duerr1
the court cited the Restatement of Torts3 5 which limits
the use of deadly force in effecting an arrest to only the more dangerous felonies. Neither Duerr, nor subsequent Pennsylvania
cases, however, adopted the view of the Restatement where the
person seeking to make the arrest was a policeman or his summoned assistant. 36 The Restatement (Second) of Torts3 changed
the original Restatement and now states that any felony is enough
to sustain the justifiable use of deadly force. The Reporter's comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts explain that although
the former view may be more desirable, the rule nevertheless was
changed to extend the right to any felony since no court had followed the view of the first Restatement.3 8 Pennsylvania courts
initially made no distinction regarding the type of felony regardless of who was attempting the arrest. They later restricted the
right of a private person, .acting without a request from a police31. Brooks v. Commonwealth, 61 Pa. 352, 359 (1869); Commonwealth
v. Duerr, 158 Pa. Super. 484, 492, 45 A.2d 235, 239 (1946); Commonwealth
v. Thompson, 26 Del. 510, 511 (Pa. C.P. 1937); Commonwealth v. Greer,
20 Pa. C.C. 535, 536 (Pa. 1898).
32. Commonwealth v. Duerr, 158 Pa. Super. 484, 492, 45 A.2d 233, 239
(1946); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 26 Del. 510, 511 (Pa. C.P. 1937);
Commonwealth v. Greer, 20 Pa. C.C. 535, 536 (Pa. 1898).
33. Commonwealth v. Grether, 204 Pa. 203, 205, 53 A. 753, 753 (1902);
Brooks v. Commonwealth, 61 Pa. 352, 358 (1869); Commonwealth v. Long,
17 Pa. Super. 641, 643 (1901).
34. 158 Pa. Super. 484, 493, 45 A.2d 235 (1946).
35. The use of force against another for the purpose of effecting an
arrest of the other by means intended or likely to cause death is privileged
if (a) the arrest is made for treason or for a felony which normally causes
or threatens death or serious bodily harm, or which involves the breaking
and entry of a dwelling place, and (b) the actor reasonably believes that
the arrest cannot otherwise be effected. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 131
(1934).

36. Commonwealth v. Allen, 443 Pa. 15, 19, 276 A.2d 539, 542 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Chermansky, 430 Pa. 170, 174, 242 A.2d 237, 240 (1968);
94 U. PA. L. REV. 327 (1946).
37. The actor's use of force against another, for the purpose of effecting a privileged arrest of the other, by means intended or likely to cause
death is privileged if (a) the arrest is made under a warrant which
charges the person named in it with the commission of treason or a felony, or if the arrest is made without a warrant for treason or for a felony
which has been committed, and (b) the other is the person named in the
warrant if the arrest is under a warrant, or the actor reasonably believes
the offense was committed by the other if the arrest is made without a
warrant, and (c) the actor reasonably believes that the arrest cannot
otherwise be effected. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 131 (1965).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Appendix, Reporter's Notes at

140 (1966).
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man, to use deadly force to effect an arrest only when certain felonies had in fact been committed. In Commonwealth v. Chermansky30 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said that after May
21, 1968, a private person is justified in using deadly force to effect
the arrest of a felon only when the felony committed was either
"treason, murder, voluntary manslaughter, mayhem, arson, robbery, common law rape, common law burglary, kidnapping, assault
with intent to murder, rape or rob, or a felony which normally
causes or threatens death or great bodily harm." 40 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, therefore, adopted the view of the original
Restatement of Torts when the actor was a private person not summoned by the police. Since Chermansky and subsequent opinions 41
were limited to private individuals, however, the old rule that any
felony is enough to sustain the justification was retained for policemen and private individuals acting at their request.
The Model Penal Code states that deadly force may be used to
effect an arrest when the arrest is for a felony and the actor believes that such felony included the use or threatened use of
deadly force. 42 Since the Model Penal Code does not permit a private person acting independently to use deadly force to effect an
arrest, 43 the standard applies only to policemen and their summoned private assistants. The Model Penal Code essentially adopts
the reasoning of the original Restatement of Torts and limits the
use of deadly force to effect an arrest to only serious felonies. In
effect then, the Model Penal Code limits the use of deadly force to
only a certain type of felony, and then defines the type felony included--one which the actor believes involves the use or threatened use of deadly force.
The Crimes Code incorporates the limitation that the deadly
force may be used only in the case of certain felonies. 44 The existing case law rule that a policeman or a private person summoned
by him may use deadly force in an arrest for any felony 4" is therefore overruled by the Crimes Code. The Code provides that the
officer or his summoned assistant may use deadly force only when
he believes that a "forcible felony" has been committed or attempted. 4" This provision of the Crimes Code is consistent with
39. 430 Pa. 170, 242 A.2d 237 (1968).
40. Id. at 174, 242 A.2d at 240.
41. Commonwealth v. Allen, 443 Pa. 15, 19, 276 A.2d 539, 542 (1971).
42. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2) (b) (iv) (1) (Proposed Off. Draft,
1962). ,
43. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2) (b) (ii) (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962).
44.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 508 (a) (i)(ii) (Supp. 1973).

45. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 508(a) (i) (ii) (Supp. 1973).

the Model Penal Code in that only a certain type of felony gives
rise to the justifiable use of deadly force in the arrest for the
crime. Unlike the Model Penal Code, however, the Crimes Code
does not adequately define the type of felony intended to support
the justification. At least four interpretations of the term seem
possible. At the one extreme is the view that any felony which
involves the use or attempted use of any force whatsoever is sufficient to justify the deadly force in effecting the arrest. At the
other extreme is the standard provided by the Model Penal Code
which states that only felonies which involve the use or threatened
use of deadly force 47 are included in the classification. Somewhere
in between these two possibilities is the list of felonies which the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has designated as sufficient to support the justification if the person attempting the arrest is an independently acting private individual. 48 This list includes treason,
murder, voluntary manslaughter, mayhem, arson, robbery, common law rape, common law burglary, kidnapping, assault with intent to murder, rape, or rob, or a felony which normally causes or
threatens death or great bodily harm. 49 Finally the term could
be interpreted as referring to that type of felony which the courts
have found necessary to support the use of deadly force in the
prevention of crime. The courts have referred to this class of
crimes as "atrocious felonies attempted by force or surprise."' 0
This classification has been held to include such felonies as sodomy attempted by force. 51
Although the term forcible felony logically could be defined
as referring to any of the above-mentioned types of felony, it is
probable that the term as used in the Crimes Code refers to any
felony which involves the use of any force, whether or not the
force is likely to cause death or serious injury. This interpretation
requires the least deviation from the existing case law rule that
any felony will support the justification.12 If the drafters of the
Crimes Code had intended to limit the justifiable use of deadly
force in effecting an arrest to only those felonies which involve the
use or threatened use of deadly force, it seem logical that they
would have adopted the language of the Model Penal Code. 3 Finally, if the drafters had intended the justification to extend to only
47.

MODEL

§ 3.07 (2) (b) (iv) (1) (Proposed Off. Draft,
1962).
48. See notes 39-41 and accompanying text supra.
49. Commonwealth v. Allen, 443 Pa. 15, 20, 276 A.2d 539, 542 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Chermansky, 430 Pa. 170, 174, 242 A.2d 237, 240 (1968).
50. Commonwealth v. Harris, 444 Pa. 515, 518, 281 A.2d 879, 881
(1971); Commonwealth v. Emmons, 157 Pa. Super. 495, 499, 43 A.2d 568,
569 (1945); Commonwealth v. Keith, 46 Berks Co. 137, 140 (Pa. C.P. 1954).
51. Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 428 Pa. 188, 192, 236 A.2d 768, 771
(1968).
52. See notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra.
53. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 (2) (b) (iv) (1) (Proposed Off. Draft,
1962).
PENAL

CODE
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a specific list of felonies or "atrocious felonies attempted by force
or surprise" it seems equally logical that they would have either
included the list in the statute or termed the type crime intended
an "atricious felony of force or surprise" rather than "forcible
felony."
E. Felony in Fact Standard
Pennsylvania case law requires that a felony in fact must have
been committed before a person may justifiably use deadly force
to effect the arrest of the felon. 54 The courts are clear on this
point; a reasonable belief that a felony was committed is not enough
to justify deadly force. 55 Either a policeman56 or a private person 5 7 may arrest a person on suspicion of felony but deadly force
may not be used on mere suspicion. The decisions indicate that
any party, whether a policeman or a private person acting independently, acts "at his peril"5 8 when he uses deadly force to effect an
arrest on suspicion that a felony has been committed. If the person
seeking to make the arrest reasonably believes that a felony has been
committed when in fact the crime was only a misdemeanor,
deadly force used to effect the arrest is not justified. 59 This "in
fact" standard applies not only to the crime but also to the suspected felon at whom the deadly force was directed. 0 In other
words, the person sought to be arrested must in fact have been
the person who committed the felony. A reasonable belief that
the person killed was the perpetrator of the felony will not support
the justification. 61
The Model Penal Code apparently retains the "in fact" standard since it provides that deadly force is not justifiable in effect54. Brooks v. Commonwealth, 61 Pa. 352, 358 (1869); Commonwealth
V. Duerr, 158 Pa. Super. 484, 492, 45 A.2d 235, 239 (1946); Commonwealth
v. Thompson, 26 Del. 510, 511 (Pa. C.P. 1937); Commonwealth v. Greer,
20 Pa. C.C. 535, 536 (Pa. 1898).
55.

Commonwealth v. Duerr, 158 Pa. Super. 484, 492, 45 A.2d 235, 239

(1946).
56.

Id.

57. Commonwealth v. Chermansky, 430 Pa. 170, 174, 242 A.2d 237, 240
(1968); Brooks v. Commonwealth, 61 Pa. 352, 358 (1869); Commonwealth
v. Thompson, 26 Del. 510, 511 (Pa. C.P. 1937).
58. Commonwealth v. Chermansky, 430 Pa. 170, 174, 242 A.2d 237, 240
(1968); Commonwealth v. Duerr, 158 Pa. Super. 484, 492, 45 A.2d 235,
239 (1946).
59. Commonwealth v. Duerr, 158 Pa. Super. 484, 492, 45 A.2d 235, 239
(1946).

60. Id.; Commonwealth v. Chermansky, 430 Pa. 170, 174, 242 A.2d

237, 240 (1968).

61. ICL

ing an arrest unless the arrest is for a felony. 2 As previously
stated, the Model Penal Code limits the use of deadly force to only
those felonies which the actor believes "involved conduct including
the use or threatened use of deadly force." 83 The Model Penal
Code, then, limits the use of deadly force in effecting an arrest to
those situations where a felony has in fact been committed and
the actor believes that the felony involved the use or threatened
use of deadly force.
The Crimes Code differs significantly from both the case law
and the Model Penal Code in its treatment of the "in fact" standard. It provides that a police officer or his summoned private
assistant may use deadly force to effect the arrest when he believes
that "the person to be arrested has committed or attempted a forcible felony ....
-64 This provision reverses the case law rule
that a felony in fact is required and that a reasonable belief is
not enough to justify the deadly force. 6 5 That this reversal of
existing law was intended by the drafters of the Crimes Code is
indicated by the comments which support the statute. 66 The statutory language extends the reasonable belief standard to the question of the identity of the person at whom the deadly force is directed since the Crimes Code requires that the actor need only reasonably believe that the person sought to be arrested committed
the forcible felony. This also reverses existing case law which provides that the person sought to be arrested must in fact have been
67
the person who committed the felony.
Although the Crimes Code and the Model Penal Code differ
the former employing an "in fact" standard, the latter a "reasonable belief" standard in determining whether a felony has been
committed by the person at whom the deadly force was directed,
the codes are consistent in providing that the actor need only believe that the felony was of the type stipulated by the respective
statutes. The Model Penal Code requires that the actor believe
that the felony committed "involved conduct including the use or
threatened use of deadly force"6 8 while the Crimes Code requires
that the actor believe that a "forcible felony" ' has been committed
or attempted.
The replacement of the existing Pennsylvania in fact standard
with the reasonable belief standard significantly enlarges the scope
of the justification defense in cases where deadly force is used by a
62.
63.
1962).
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
1962).
69.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2) (b) (i) (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2) (b) (iv) (1) (Proposed Off. Draft,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 508 (a) (1) (ii) (Supp. 1973).
See notes 54-58 and accompanying text supra.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 508, Drafter's Comments, 9.
See notes 60 and 61 and accompanying text supra.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 (2) (b) (iv) (1) (Proposed Off. Draft,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 508(a) (1) (ii) (Supp. 1973).
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policeman or his summoned private assistant in effecting an arrest. In the use of such force by an independently acting private
individual, however, the application of the justification defense in
this context is narrower than the existing case law rule. The
Crimes Code provides that a private individual, not summoned by
a policeman, may not use deadly force to effect an arrest unless he
"believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or serious
bodily injury to himself or another." 70 Like the Model Penal
Code,7 ' therefore, the Crimes Code does not extend the defense of
justification to an independently acting private individual attempting to effect an arrest. The Crimes Code retains the case
law rule that permits a private person, not summoned by a policeman, to arrest a person he believes has committed a crime, 72 but
unlike the case law does not in any case except self defense or defense of another, permit the individual to follow through with
deadly force to complete the arrest. If the person sought to be
arrested defeats the arrest with acts that do not endanger the actor or another, such as flight, the private individual must stop
short of deadly force in affecting the arrest. Since existing case
law permits an independently acting private individual to effect
an arrest with deadly force under certain circumstances,7 3 the
Crimes Code has in this context narrowed the existing rule as to
when such force is justified in effecting an arrest.
II.

PREVENTION

OF

ESCAPE

Although both the Model Penal Code 74 and the Crimes Code7 5
have separate sections concerning the justifiable use of force in
70. A private person who makes, or assists another private person in
making a lawful arrest is justified in the use of any force which he would
be justified in using if he were summoned or directed by a peace officer to
make such arrest, except that he is justified in the use of deadly force only
when he believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or serious
bodily injury to himself or another. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 508(b) (1)
(Supp. 1973).
71.
72.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2) (b) (ii) (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 508(b) (1) (Supp. 1973).

73. See notes 39-41 and accompanying text supra.
74. The use of force to prevent the escape of an arrested person from
custody is justifiable when the force could justifiably have been employed
to effect the arrest under which the person is in custody, except that a
guard or other person authorized to act as a peace officer is justified in
using any force, including deadly force, which he believes to be immediately necessary to prevent the escape of a person from a jail, prison, or
other institution for the detention of persons charged with or convicted of
a crime. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 (3)

(Proposed Off. Draft, 1962).

75. (1) A peace officer or other person who has an arrested person
in his custody is justified in the use of such force to prevent the escape

preventing the escape of a person who has been arrested, the case
law rules of justification are the same for the use of deadly force
in effecting an arrest and in preventing an escape from custody.
The general rule is that either a policeman78 or a private individual 77 may use deadly force to prevent the escape of a felon but
not of a misdemeanant. The courts have rationalized this distinction by recognizing that "[t]he security of person and property
is not endangered by a petty offender (misdemeanant) being at
large, as in the case of a felon ....

"18

The previous discussion

of the case law requirements of necessity, fresh pursuit, type of
felony, and in fact standard are equally relevant in determining
the justification of deadly force used to prevent the escape from
custody of a person who has been arrested.
With one exception the Model Penal Code 9 and the Crimes
Code 0 provide that a person attempting to prevent the escape of
an arrested person may use deadly force to prevent the escape only
if the deadly force would have been justified in effecting the arrest.
These provisions are consistent with the case law approach of
making no distinction between efforts to effect an arrest and prevent an escape in consideration of the use of justifiable deadly
force.
The exception embodied in both the Model Penal Code and the
Crimes Code concerns the use of deadly force in preventing the
escape of a person confined in a prison. The Model Penal Code
provides that deadly force may be used when the actor believes
it is "immediately necessary to prevent the escape of a person from
a jail, prison, or other institution for the detention of persons
charged with or convicted of a crime." 81 No distinction is made
between prisoners who have already been convicted and those who
are only charged with a crime, or between those convicted of or
charged with a felony and those convicted of or charged with a
misdemeanor. The Crimes Code provision is similar to the Model
Penal Code in that it extends the justification to the guard or
peace officer's use of deadly force when he believes such force is
of the arrested person from custody as he would be justified in using if
he were arresting such person. (2) A guard or other peace officer is justified in the use of force, including deadly force, which he believes to be
necessary to prevent the escape from a correctional institution of a person
whom the officer believes to be lawfully detained in such institution under
sentence for an offense or awaiting trial or commitment for an offense.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 508(C) (Supp. 1973).
76. Commonwealth v. Loughead, 218 Pa. 429, 431, 67 A. 747, 748
(1907); Commonwealth v. LaPorta, 218 Pa. Super. 1, 8, 272 A.2d 516, 520
(1970); Geiger v. Madden, 58 Pa. Super. 616, 622 (1915); Commonwealth
v. Rhoads, 23 Pa. Super. 512, 516 (1903); Commonwealth v. Greer, 20 Pa.
C.C. 535, 536 (Pa. C.P. 1898).
77. Commonwealth v. Micuso, 273 Pa. 474, 476, 117 A. 211, 212 (1922);
Commonwealth v. Long, 17 Pa. Super. 641, 643 (1901).
78. Commonwealth v. Rhoads, 23 Pa. Super. 512, 516 (1903).
79. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 (3) (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962).
80. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 508 (c) (Supp. 1973).
81. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07 (3) (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962).
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necessary to prevent the escape of a person from a prison. 82 The
Crimes Code provides that the actor is justified in using the deadly
force to prevent the escape of a person "whom the officer believes
to be lawfully detained in such institution ....
"83 These provisions of the Crimes Code and Model Penal Code are basically consistent with cases and statutory law in effect before the Crimes
Code. As previously stated, at common law a police officer, or in
this context a prison guard, is justified in using deadly force to effect the arrest or prevent the escape of a person who has committed a felony. 4 Pennsylvania statutory law makes prison
breach a felony 5 and therefore provides the grounds for the justification. Since the Crimes Code and Model Penal Code provide
that the guard need only reasonably believe that the person upon
whom the deadly force was used was a prisoner,86 however, it extends the justification to the narrow case where the person killed
was reasonably mistaken as a prisoner. Under case law such a
mistake would not have been justified because no felony in fact
would have been committed.
The Crimes Code further provides that deadly force may justifiably be used when the actor believes that
Such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being
defeated by resistance or escape, and the person to be arrested . . . is attempting to escape and possesses a deadly

weapon, or otherwise indicates that he will endanger human life or inflict
serious bodily injury unless arrested
87
without delay.
The Model Penal Code does not contain this specific provision although it does provide that the deadly force is justified where
the actor believes that "there is a substantial risk that the person
to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily harm if his apprehension is delayed."8 8 Within the context of justifiable deadly
force to prevent escape, these provisions are not entirely supported
by existing Pennsylvania law. The case law is consistent with the
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 508(c) (2) (Supp. 1973).
83. Id.
84. See notes 54-61 and accompanying text supra.
85. Any person undergoing imprisonment who breaks prison or escapes, or shall break prison although no escape is actually made, is guilty
of prison breach, a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be sentenced
to undergo imprisonment, by separate and solitary confinement at labor, for
a term not exceeding ten (10) years. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4309
(1964).
86. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 508(c) (2) (Supp. 1973).
82.

87.
88.

1962).

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 508(a) (1) (ii) (Supp. 1973).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2) (b) (iv) (2)
(Proposed Off. Draft,

provisions in that the force is justified if the person attempting
to escape has in fact committed a felony.89 Since the Crimes Code
provides that the deadly force is justified if the actor believes that
it is necessary to effect the arrest and the person sought to be arrested possesses a deadly weapon, 90 and the Model Penal Code provides that the deadly force is justified where the actor believes
that there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will
cause death or serious bodily harm if his apprehension is delayed, 91
the statutes apparently include the attempted escape of a misdemeanant who the actor reasonably but mistakenly believes is carrying such a weapon. In this respect the statutes are inconsistent
may not use
with existing case law which holds that a policeman
92
deadly force to stop an escaping misdemeanant
III.

A.

PREVENTION OF THE COMvMISSION OF CRIME

Necessity

Pennsylvania case law provides that under appropriate circumstances either a police officer or an independently acting private
93
person may use deadly force to prevent the commission of a crime.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has said that "[f] or the protection of the weak and unfortunate and the assertion of the duties
of humanity reliance must be had on the ancient and settled right
to interfere to prevent a felony ....
-94 According to the case
law, however, before the deadly force is justified the actor must
believe that it is necessary. 5 Although some courts have said that
the necessity for the use of the deadly force must be "clear of
doubt, ' 98 a reasonable belief is sufficient to sustain the justificaon.

97

The Crimes Code adopts the language of the Model Penal Code
concerning justifiable force used to prevent a crime.", The statutory language, like the case law, requires that the deadly force must
89.

See notes 54-61 and accompanying text supra.

90.
91.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 508(a) (1) (ii) (Supp. 1973).

MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2) (b) (iv) (2)
(Proposed Off. Draft,
1962).
92. See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
93. Commonwealth v. Commander, 436 Pa. 532, 539, 260 A.2d 773, 777
(1968); Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 428 Pa. 188, 192, 236 A.2d 768, 771
(1945); Commonwealth v. Emmons, 157 Pa. Super. 495, 498, 43 A.2d 568,
569 (1970).
94. Commonwealth v. Paese, 220 Pa. 371, 378, 69 A. 891, 894 (1908).
95. Commonwealth v. Harris, 444 Pa. 515, 518, 281 A.2d 879, 881
(1971); Commonwealth v. Russogulo, 263 Pa. 93, 106, 106 A. 180, 185
(1919); Commonwealth v. Paese, 220 Pa. 371, 378, 69 A. 891, 894 (1908).
96. Commonwealth v. Russogulo, 263 Pa. 93, 106, 106 A. 180, 185
(1919); Commonwealth v. Paese, 220 Pa. 371, 378, 69 A. 891, 894 (1908);
Kilpatrick v. Commonwealth, 31 Pa. 198 (1858).
97. Commonwealth v. Harris, 444 Pa. 515, 518, 281 A.2d 879, 881 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Russogulo, 263 Pa. 93, 106, 106 A. 180, 185 (1919).
98. (1) The use of force upon or toward the person of another is
justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary
to prevent such other person from committing suicide, inflicting serious
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be necessary to prevent the crime in order to establish the justification. Specifically the Crimes Code provides that force to prevent a crime is justifiable only when the actor reasonably believes
it "immediately necessary" to prevent a person from "committing
or consummating the commission of a crime." 99
B. Type of Crime
Existing case law limits the use of deadly force to prevent a
crime to only certain felonies. 100 In Commonwealth v. Emmons, 0 1
the court held that,
[T] here is no right to kill in order to prevent any felony.
The taking of human life is justifiable when done for the
prevention of any atrocious crime attempted to be committed with force. A homicide is justifiable when committed by necessity and in good faith in order to prevent a felony attempted by force or surprise, such as murder, robbery, burglary, arson, rape, sodomy, and the like.
Killing to prevent a felony is not justifiable if the felony
is a secret one, or unaccompanied by force .... 102
The case law justification for the use of deadly force to prevent
a felony is limited to "atrocious felonies attempted by force or surprise." The courts require that the actor reasonably believe that
serious injury will result to himself or another if the attempted
bodily injury upon himself, committing or consummating the commission
of a crime involving or threatening bodily injury, damage to or loss of
property or a breach of the peace, except that:

(i) any limitations

imposed by the other provisions of this chapter on the justifiable use of
force in self-protection, for the protection of others, the protection of
property, the effectuation of an arrest or the prevention of an escape from
custody shall apply notwithstanding the criminality of the conduct against

which such force is used. (ii) the use of deadly force is not in any event
justifiable under the subsection unless: (A) The actor believes that there
is a substantial risk that the person whom he seeks to prevent from committing a crime will cause death or serious bodily injury to another unless the commission or the consummation of the crime is prevented and
that the use of such force presents no substantial risk of injury to innocent
persons; or (B) The actor believes that the use of such force is necessary
to suppress a riot or mutiny after the rioters or mutineers have been ordered to disperse and warned, in any particular manner that the law may
require, that such force will be used if they do not obey. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 508 (d) (Supp. 1973); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(5) (Proposed Off.
Draft, 1962).
99. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 508(d) (Supp. 1973); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 3.07(5) (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962).
100. Commonwealth v. Harris, 444 Pa. 515, 518, 281 A.2d 879, 881
(1971); Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 428 Pa. 188, 192, 236 A.2d 768, 771
(1968); Commonwealth v. Emmons, 157 Pa. Super. 495, 498, 43 A.2d 568,
569 (1945).
101. 157 Pa. Super.495, 43 A.2d 568 (1945).
102. Id. at 498, 43 A.2d at 569 [court's emphasis].

felony is not prevented.10 3 Because the justification is grounded
on a belief that serious bodily harm will result if the crime is not
prevented, the elements of the defense are identical to those required to support the homicide as justifiable self defense. This
similarity has resulted in cases where the actor has based his defense of justification on both the right to use deadly force to prevent a felony and alternatively on the right of self defense or defense of another.10 4 In such cases the courts have given primary
emphasis to the rules of self defense in determining the merits of
the actor's defense of justification. 10 5
A further limitation imposed by the courts on the use of
deadly force to prevent an atrocious felony attempted by force
or surprise is the requirement that the policeman or independently
acting private individual must believe that the anticipated death
or serious bodily injury to be prevented is "imminent.' 0 6 In
Commonwealth v. Russogulol° T the court said that "[t]he general
rule of law is a bona fide belief by the defendant that a felony
is in process of commission, which can only be averted by the
death of the supposed felon, makes the killing excusable homicide." 108 This limitation has been held to defeat the justification defense when the actor used deadly force to subdue a person who previously had attacked another on the ground that the
actor believed that the attacker would resume his advances even
though he was retiring from his victim at the time the deadly force
was used.10 9 The requirement that the threatened injury must be
imminent also precludes the defense when the deadly force is used
to prevent an anticipated future felony. For example in Commonwealth v. Keith 10 the court refused to sustain the defendant's defense of justification when he set a spring gun to protect against
burglars and the mechanism later killed a felon who had broken
into defendant's summer home."'
103. Commonwealth v. Capalla, 322 Pa. 200, 204, 185 A. 203, 205 (1936);
Commonwealth v. Keith, 46 Berks 137, 140 (Pa. C.P. 1954).
104. Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 428 Pa. 188, 192, 236 A.2d 768, 771
.(1968); Commonwealth v. Russogulo, 263 Pa. 93, 106, 106 A. 180, 185
(1919); Commonwealth v. Paese, 220 Pa. 371, 378, 69 A 891, 894 (1908).
105. Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 428 Pa. 188, 192, 236 A.2d 768, 771
(1968); Commonwealth v. Russogulo, 263 Pa. 93, 106, 106 A. 180, 185
(1919); Commonwealth v. Paese, 220 Pa. 371, 378, 69 A. 891, 894 (1908).
106. Commonwealth v. Russogulo, 263 Pa. 93, 106, 106 A. 180, 185 (1919);
Commonwealth v. Paese, 220 Pa. 371, 378, 69 A. 891, 894 (1908).
107. 263 Pa. 93, 106 A.180 (1919).
108. Id. at 106, 106 A. at 185. Although a court occasionally will
point out the difference between excusable and justifiable homicide, see,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 428 Pa. 188, 197 and n.1, 236 A.2d 768,
770 and n.1 (1968), the distinction apparently has become largely academic
and most cases make no distinction between them. See BLACK'S LAW
DIcTIONARY 867 (4th ed. 1951).
109. Commonwealth v. Paese, 220 Pa. 371, 378, 69 A. 891, 892 (1908).
110. 46 Berks Co. 137 (Pa. C.P. 1954).
111. Id. at 140.
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Although the courts have included felonies which do not necessarily involve the imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm,
such as robbery and burglary, in their list of "atrocious felonies
attempted by force or surprise" 112 which are sufficient to justify
deadly force, the opinions in practice have limited the defense to
those cases where such felonies were accompanied by the threat of
such imminent harm."13 In Commonwealth v. Emmons 1 4 the
the court said that "[k] illing is justified in protection of property
only where an element of danger to the person of the slayer is present." 1 5 Considering the same issue the court in Commonwealth
v. Keith"8 reasoned that deadly force may sometimes be justified
in defense of a dwelling or to prevent a felony attempted by force
or surprise, such as burglary, but stated that,
these broader statements must . . .be interpreted to apply only to circumstances in which the court's more restricted principle is applicable, namely to burglaries and
invasion of dwellings, done or attempted under such circumstances that an element of danger to the person of the
slayer is present . . . .117
Thus, existing Pennsylvania case law justifies the use of deadly
force to prevent a crime only when the actor reasonably believes
that the crime will result in death or serious injury to himself or
another.
The Crimes Code provides that deadly force is justified when
"the actor believes that there is a substantial risk that the person
whom he seeks to prevent from committing a crime will cause a
death or serious bodily injury to another unless the commission or
the consummation of the crime is prevented ....,,11 This language codifies the case law rule that the justification arises from a
threat of harm to the actor or another. Even though the Crimes
Code does not refer to the "atrocious felony attempted by force
or surprise" discussed in the case law, the standard imposed in the
statute is identical with that of the courts. In Pennsylvania a person may not use deadly force to prevent a crime unless he acts on
a reasonable belief that death or serious bodily harm will result
if the crime is not prevented. The absence in the statute of the
112. Commonwealth v. Emmons, 157 Pa. Super. 495, 498, 43 A.2d 568,
569 (1945).
113. Commonwealth v. Harris, 444 Pa. 515, 518, 281 A.2d 879, 881
(1971); Commonwealth v. Keith, 46 Berks Co. 137, 140 (Pa. C.P. 1954).
114. 157 Pa. Super. 495, 43 A.2d 568 (1945).
115. Id. at 498, 43 A.2d at 569.
116. 46 Berks Co. 137 (Pa. C.P. 1954).
117. Id. at 140.
(A) (Supp.1973).
118. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 508(d) (1)(ii)

case law requirement that the crime must be an atrocious felony
does not alter existing law since the real test applied by the courts
is whether the actor reasonably believed that death or serious
bodily harm would result from his inaction." 9 Thus, the Crimes
Code standard is the same as that of the case law since the courts
in practice have defined "atrocious felony committed by force or
surprise" as a crime which the actor believed would result in death
or serious bodily harm to himself or another. The case law re1 20
quirement that the injury to be prevented must be imminent
is embodied in the Crimes Code since it is logically essential to
establish the reasonableness of the actor's belief. It is submitted
that if the threatened injury was not existing at the time the deadly
force was used, or if the crime were already consummated when
the force was applied, the Code requirement that the actor reasonably believe that the force was "immediately necessary" to
prevent serious harm is not established.
The Crimes Code further provides that deadly force may not
be used to prevent a crime unless the policeman or independently
acting private individual believes "that the use of such force presents no substantial risk of injury to innocent persons."'12' Since
the basis of the justification in both the Crimes Code and existing
law is a belief that the deadly force is necessary to prevent harm
to the actor or another, this language merely reaffirms the underlying basis of the justification. If the actor may not use the force
unless he believes that it is necessary for self defense or defense
of another, he logically is not justified in using it when he realizes
that its use involves a substantial risk of harm to an innocent person.
The Model Penal Code and Crimes Code provide that, "[a]ny
limitation imposed by the other provisions of this chapter on the
justifiable use of force in . . . the effectuation of an arrest or the
prevention of an escape from custody shall apply notwithstanding
22
the criminality of the conduct against which such force is used.'
Since the statutes limit the use of deadly force in effecting an arrest or preventing an escape to policemen and their summoned private assistants, 1 2 this restriction also apparently applies to the
use of deadly force to prevent a crime. In the context of deadly
force used to prevent a crime, however, this limitation is not limited
to private persons since both statutes provide the same standard
for policemen and independently acting private individuals. Thus,
the Model Penal Code and the Crimes Code permit policemen and
See notes 112-17 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 106-111 and accompanying text supra.
121. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 508(d) (1) (ii) (A) (Supp. 1973).
The lan122. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 508(d) (1) (i) (Supp. 1973).
guage of the Model Penal Code is identical to that of the Crimes Code on
this point.
123. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 508(a) (1) (Supp. 1973); MODEL PENAL
119.
120.

CODE § 3.07 (2) (b) (ii) (Proposed Off. Draft, 1962).
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independently acting private individuals to use force to prevent a
crime, but limit the use of deadly force to self defense and defense of another. This is consistent with common law since the
courts in practice have limited the defense to only those situations
where the deadly force is believed necessary to prevent a crime involving a threat of death or serious bodily injury to the actor or
124
another.
C. Suppression of a Riot
It has been observed that "[a] riotous mob is the most dangerous thing on the face of the earth. Of all animals under the sun,
men running mad are the worst in their fury."'125 Perhaps because of the truth of this observation existing case law permits
the use of deadly force to suppress a riot whenever the actor believes that such force is necessary to disperse the crowd. 126 The
deadly force may be used by a policeman or his summoned private assistant as well as by an independently acting private individual. 127 The courts have noted, however, that it would be
"more discreet" for the private individual to "be assistant on the
justices or sheriff."'128 The deadly force must be necessary and is
129
justified only when the rioters resist or refuse to surrender.
The basis of the justification is the threatened danger to person
and property posed by a riot.
The Crimes Code provision that an actor may use deadly force
when he "believes that the use of such force is necessary to suppress a riot or mutiny after the rioters or mutineers have been
ordered to disperse and warned ...that such force will be used
if they do not obey," 1" 0 is a codification of the common law. The
deadly force may be used upon a reasonable belief that such force
is necessary to subdue the crowd. The requirement that the mob
must be ordered to disperse and warned of the intent to use the
deadly force is supported by the case law. In Commonwealth v.
Daley"' 1 the court held that "no one, whether private citizen or
124. See notes 112-117 and accompanying text supra.
125. Commonwealth v. Scranton, 7 Luz. L.R. 31, 36 (Pa. C.P. 1878).
126. Commonwealth v. Hare, 2 Clark 467, 474 (Pa. 1844); Commonwealth v. Stewart, 58 Dauph. 209, 218 (Pa. C.P. 1947); Commonwealth v.
Scranton, 7 Luz. L.R. 31, 36 (Pa. C.P. 1878).
127. Id.
128. Commonwealth v. Hare, 2 Clark 467, 473 (Pa. 1844).
129. Id. Commonwealth v. Daley, 2 Clark 361, 371 (Pa. 1844); Commonwealth v. Stewart, 58 Dauph. 209, 218 (Pa. C.P. 1947).
130. PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 18, § 508(d) (1) (ii) (B) (Supp. 1973).
131. 2 Clark 361 (Pa. 1844).

public officer, would have been authorized to fire upon [the rioting
group] until other means were resorted to for its dispersion, and
necessities arose from the manner and extent of the resistance to
' 32
such means, demanding extremities.'
The common law and Crimes Code rule that deadly force may
be used to suppress a riot is consistent with the rules concerning
the justifiable use of deadly force to prevent a crime. In Pennsylvania riotous destruction of property is a felony' 3 3 and a group
of people engaged in a riot logically is sufficient to sustain a reasonable belief that an "atrocious felony attempted by force" which
involves a threat of death or serious bodily harm will result if the
riot is not immediately suppressed. 13 4 Similarly, the Crimes Code
requirement that "the actor believe that there is a substantial risk
that the person [crowd] he seeks to prevent from committing a
crime [riotous destruction of property] will cause death or serious
bodily injury to another unless the commission or the consummation of the crime is prevented,""15 is met when deadly force is used
to suppress a riot.
Although essentially a codification of existing Pennsylvania
case law, the statutory language restricts the common law justification defense in one respect. Since the rules concerning the use
of force to suppress a riot are embodied in the statutory section
dealing with prevention of crime,"36 the restriction that the use of
deadly force is limited to policemen and their summoned assistants ' 7 is applicable. Under the Crimes Code an independently
acting private person may use force to suppress a riot, but he must
stop short of deadly force unless he acts in self defense or defense
of another. The practical significance of this limitation is minimal,
however, since a riotous crowd would seem sufficient to justify
a reasonable belief that a serious threat of death or bodily harm to
the actor or another is present and therefore would justify the
deadly force as an act of self defense.
CONCLUSION

The Crimes Code provisions concerning the justifiable use of
deadly force in effecting an arrest are basically consistent with
132.

Id. at 371.

133. Whoever, while participating in a riotous and tumultuous assembly, unlawfully, and with force, demolishes or pulls down or destroys,
or begins to demolish, pull down or destroy any public or private building
or any machinery, whether fixed or movable, is guilty of a felony, and
upon conviction thereof, shall be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding
two thousand ($2000), or to undergo imprisonment, by separate or solitary
confinement at labor or by simple imprisonment, not exceeding five
(5) years, or both. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4402 (1964).
134. See notes 100-03 and accompanying text supra.
135. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 508(d) (1) (ii) (A) (Supp. 1973).
136. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 508(d) (Supp. 1973).
137. See notes 122-24 and accompanying text supra.
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existing law so far as concerns the elements of necessity, fresh pursuit and notice. The Code's treatment of the type of felony required to support the justification and the judicial standard used
to measure the justification of the force, however, are significantly
different from the case law rules. The Crimes Code, like the Model Penal Code, limits the use of deadly force to only certain felonies, but unlike the Model Penal Code does not define the type felony intended to support the justification. The extent of deviation
from the common law rule that any felony will support the deadly
force is dependent upon how the courts define the term forcible
felony as used in the Crimes Code. The Crimes Code provision
which replaces the existing in fact standard with a reasonable belief standard extends the scope of the justification defense. Because the Crimes Code limits the use of deadly force in effecting
an arrest to policemen and their summoned private assistants, however, it also restricts the defense when the actor is an independently acting private individual. This exclusion of private persons is desirable in light of the replacement of the common law
in fact standard with the reasonable belief standard of the Crimes
Code.
The new reasonable belief standard also alters existing law
concerning the justifiable use of deadly force to prevent an escape.
The case law standard that the escaping criminal must have in
fact committed a felony is replaced by the Crimes Code test of reasonable belief. With minor exceptions the Crimes Code and Model
Penal Code embody the existing rule that deadly force is justified
in preventing an escape only when it would have been justified in
effecting the arrest.
In the use of deadly force to prevent a crime the Crimes Code
'adopts the language of the Model Penal Code and essentially codifies existing law. Neither the statutes nor the cases differentiate
between policemen or independently acting private individuals in
the use of deadly force to prevent a crime. Both the statutes and
case law require that the actor must believe that the deadly force
is necessary to prevent a crime which involves an imminent threat
of death or serious bodily harm to the actor or another. Since
the underlying basis for the justifiable use of deadly force to prevent a crime is the prevention of death or serious bodily harm to
the actor or another, the justification is not applicable where the
use of such force presents a substantial risk of injury to an innocent
person.
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